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LEGISLATIVE DISQUALIFICATIONS AS BILLS OF
ATTAINDER
FRANCIS D. WORMUTH*

The separation of powers was first introduced into political discussion
during the English Civil Wars of the seventeenth century by the political
party known as Levellers. 1 The object was to insure that persons be judged
by general and prospective rules. If the legislative authority should decide
a particular case, it might be tempted through partiality or prejudice to improvise a special rule for the situation. So the separation of powers was
intended to achieve that impartiality in government which Aristotle called

"the rule of law."
The doctrine of checks and balances was also introduced into political
discussion during the Civil Wars, and with the Stuart Restoration in 1660
it became the official description of the English constitution. 2 King, Lords and
Commons were in a condition of equilibrium. "Like three distinct powers in
mechanics, they jointly impel the machine of government in a direction different from what either, acting by itself, would have done; but at the same
time in a direction partaking of each, and formed out of all; a direction
which constitutes the true line of the liberty and happiness of the community. ' 3 By the time Blackstone wrote these words, the tripartite division
of legislative power had already yielded to what we call today the cabinet
system.
The separation of powers was an idea about law; checks and balances
was an idea about legislation. The proposition that men should be judged
by general and prospective rules implies nothing about the composition of
political forces in the legislature. It does imply a division of function between the framing of rules on the one hand and the administration of rules
on the other.
Most of the early American constitutions explicitly indorsed the separation of powers-those adopted by Virginia, Maryland and North Carolina
in 1776, by Georgia in 1777, by Massachusetts in 1780, and by New Hampshire in 1784. The principle was incorporated in the distribution of powers
in the new Federal Constitution as well as in all state constitutions adopted
subsequently. Yet of the early state constitutions J. Allen Smith has said
truly: "The English system of checks and balances was discarded for the
more democratic one under which all the important powers of government
were vested in the legislature." 4
*Professor of Political Science, University of Utah.
1. See WORMtUTH, THE
2. Id., cc. 7, 18.
3. 1 BL. Coii. *155.
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Checks and balances, however, reappeared with a new object. Thomas
Jefferson protested against the Virginia constitution that it left the executive and judiciary dependent upon the legislature. "If therefore the legislature
assumes executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made;
nor, if made, can it be effectual: because in that case they may put their
proceedings into the form of an act of assembly, which will render them
obligatory on the other branches." 5 To prevent this, he believed that "the
powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several
bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others." The same
reasoning underlies some of the debates in the Constitutional Convention and
the argument for checks and balances in the Federalist, where, indeed,
Madison quotes Jefferson as an authority.7 The Federal Constitution incorporated both the separation of powers and checks and balances; and this
plan prevailed in the revision of state constitutions thereafter.
So the separation of powers wa's invented in order to insure generality
and prospectivity in law. Checks and balances was originally a political
doctrine, but with Jefferson it became a device to protect the separation of
powers. It has never lost its political flavor; instead, it has imparted that
flavor to the separation of powers, so that today both ideas are commonly
thought to rest on the proposition -that the division of power is a salutary
political principle. This proposition has fallen on hard times, with the consequence that both the separation of powers and checks and balances are in
considerable disrepute among political scientists.
Nevertheless it is true that the most characteristic inechanical features
of our Constitution were not addressed to the problem of power but to an
idea about law. Their purpose was further implemented by the prohibitions
on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, by the contract clause in the
Federal Constitution, and by the prohibitions on special legislation in state
constitutions. This idea about law is one of the most striking features in the
Anglo-American constitutional tradition. The passages in which John Locke, 8
BlackstoneP and Daniel Webster"0 indorsed it are well known. Webster's
definiton--"By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law;
a law, which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and
5.

JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA,

Query 13 (1784).

6. Ibid.

7. THE FEDERALIST, No. 48 (Madison). The following statement is, at the least, an
enormous exaggeration: -"It was mainly for the purpose of arresting the tendency toward
political democracy that the system of checks and balances in the federal Constitution was
devised." SMITH, THE GROWTH AND DECADENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 81

(1930).

8. LocKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 142 (1690).
9. 1 BL. Comm. *44.
10. In his argument in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 579-82,

4 L. Ed. 629 (1819).
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renders judgment only after trial"--epitomizes a whole epoch of constitutional law.11
The most familiar example of the evils of joining legislative with judicial
power is the bill of attainder. Protest first arose against the use of this
device in 1641.12 It was with difficulty that the last bill of attainder in English
history, that of Sir John Fenwick in 1696, was pushed through Parliament.
In America bills of attainder were passed in colonial days and during the
Confederacy, but informed opinion disapproved of the practice, and it was
apparently without debate that the framers of the Federal Constitution forbade both the national government and the states to pass bills of attainder.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the term bill of attainder
had been given no precise legal definition. Only with the constitutional
prohibitions on action of this sort did definition become necessary. There
was, to be sure, a body of practice to which the term referred and which
supplied guidance. Justice Story described the practice thus:
"Bills of attainer, as they are technically called, are such special acts of the legislature as inflict capital punishments upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offenses,
such as treason and felony, without any conviction in the ordinary court of judicial
proceedings. If an act inflicts a milder degree of punishment than death, it is called
a bill of pains and penalties. But in the sense of the Constitution, it seems that bills of
attainder include bills of pains and penalties.... In such cases, the legislature assumes
judicial magistracy, pronouncing on the guilt of the party without any of the common
forms and guards of trial, and satisfying itself with proofs, when such proofs are
within its reach, whether they are conformable to the rules of evidence or not. In short,
in all such cases, the legislature exercises the highest power of sovereignty, and what
may be properly deemed an irresponsible despotic discretion, being governed solely
by what it deems political necessity or expediency, and too often under the influence of
unreasonable fears or unfounded suspicions.""
Bills of pains and penalties commonly imposed civil disabilities, such
as ineligibility for public office. It is in this area that controversy has arisen.
Clearly it is appropriate for the legislature to establish qualifications for
officeholders and for the practitioners of a wide variety of professions and
callings. Clearly it is inappropriate for the legislature to assume judicial
magistracy, determining fault without trial, and by legislative act to exclude
the persons thus condemned from office or a designated vocation. The problem is to distinguish these two situations.
11. The early doctrine of vested rights rested on the ideas expressed by Webster.
See Corwin, A Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Ladw, 12 MicH. L. REv. 247
(1914). For a time it found support in the eminent domain and due process clauses,
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); but it perished in Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205 (1887), with the holding that eminent domain
did not apply and the due process clause did not afford absolute protection to vested
rights in property. The bill of attainder clause is of course absolute.
12. MACILwAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT 153 (1910).
13. 2 SToRxY, COMMENTARIES ON TEE CONSTITUTION § 1344 (5th ed., Bigelow, 1891).
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Two tests have been advanced, one by Justice Field and the other by
Justice Frankfurter. It is not certain that Justice Field considered his test
to be exhaustive; Justice Frankfurter believed his to be so. It appears
that each correctly identified a particular use of the bill of attainder; but
there are situations which are explained by neither test. The bill of attainder clause, like the ex post facto clause, can be violated in more than
one way.
In Cummings v. Missouri,14 Justice Field held that a provision in the
Missouri constitution of 1865 which forbade persons to hold office or to
follow certain callings unless they took an elaborate oath disclaiming participation in or sympathy with the rebellion was a bill of attainder. He relied
heavily but not exclusively upon the assertion that many of the disclaimers
required by the oath were irrelevant to many of the activities in question.
This made them penalties rather than qualifications. In Pierce v. Carskadon,15
in 1872, a West Virginia statute which conditioned access to the courts upon
the taking of an oath that the applicant had not participated in the rebellion
was held to be a bill of attainder. Here the disability clearly had no relevance
to the privilege. Probably no one ivill quarrel with the holdings in these cases. 10
On the other hand, relevant disqualifications have also been held to be
penalties. In Ex parte Garland,17 a companion case to Cummings v. Missouri,
a federal statute which required attorneys to take an oath disavowing any
part in the rebellion as a condition of admission to practice in the federal
courts was declared to be a bill of attainder. It could not honestly be said
that this requirement was irrelevant to the practice of law. Justice Field,
who wrote the opinion, made no such claim, although he purported to rely
on Cummings v. Missouri.'8 And in United States v. Lovett,'0 a provision
of a Congressional appropriation act which barred three named individuals
from public employment as subversive was held to be a bill of attainder,
although subversiveness is clearly a valid disqualification for public employment.

20

14. 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. Ed. 356 (1867).
15. 16 Wall. 234, 21 L. Ed. 276 (1872).
16. See in accord, Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 82 Am. Dec. 65 (1862) ; Kyle v.
Jenkins, 6 W. Va. 371 (1873).
17. 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366 (1867).
18. However, in Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128, 9 Sup. Ct. 231, 32 L. Ed.
623 (1889), Justice Field asserted of the Cummings and Garland cases: "The constitution
of Missouri and the act of Congress in question in those cases were designed to deprive
parties of their right to continue in their professions for past acts or past expressions of
desires and sympathies, many of which had no bearing upon their fitness to continue in
their professions."
19. 328 U.S. 303, 66 Sup. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed. 1252 (1946).
20. Even the suspicion of subversiveness will justify administrative removal. Friedman
v. Schwellenbach, 159 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 838 (1947)
Washington v. Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964 (D.D.C. 1949).
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In his concurring opinion in the Lovett case Mr. Justice Frankfurter
undertook to shift the problem. He argued that the disqualification of the
three was not a bill of attainder because Congress had failed to announce
that it was punishing a past offense. The. bills of attainder with which the
framers were familiar had always nakedly declared their purpose; consequently no Congressional act is a bill of attainder if Congress does not
state a prohibited purpose. This viewpoint was rejected by the majority
in the Lovett case, but it apparently contributed to the holding in American
Communications Association v. Douds,21 where Chief Justice Vinson upheld
section 9(h) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, the TaftHartley Act, 22 which denied the facilities of the National Labor Relations
Board to unions whose officers did not file affidavits disavowing membership
in the Communist party. The Chief Justice attempted to distinguish the
Cummings, Garland and Lovett cases:
"Those cases and this also, according to the argument, involve the proscription of
certain occupations to a group classified according to belief and loyalty. But there

is a decisive distinction: in the previous decisions the individuals involved were in fact
being punished for past actions; whereas in this case they are subject to possible loss
of position only because there is substantial ground for the congressional judgment that
their beliefs and loyalties will be transformed into future conduct. Of course, the history
of the past conduct is the foundation for the judgment as to what the future conduct
is likely to be; but that does not alter the conclusion that § 9(h) is intended to prevent

future action rather than to punish past action."'

This of course flies in the teeth of the Garland and Lovett cases, in both
of which the alleged fault which gave rise to the disqualification was
highly pertinent to future conduct. If there is a difference in the legislative
intent, the Court can have discovered it only by intuition. But the premise
as well as the application seems to be unsound. It means that a completely
capricious measure must escape condemnation as a bill of attainder because
it is grounded on no offense whatever. If the legislature is forbidden to
punish a man for cause, surely it is forbidden to punish a man without
cause. It has also been suggested that under some circumstances a measure
24
penalizing a future act or omission may be a bill of attainder.
21. 339 U.S. 382, 70 Sup. Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 597 (1950).
22. 61

STAT.

143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (Supp. 1950).

23. 339 U.S. at 413.
24. See Doe ex dent. Gaines v. Buford, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 481, 510 (1833) : "A bill
of attainder is not necessarily an ex post facto law. A British act of parliament might

declare that if certain individuals or a class of individuals, failed to do a given act by

a named day, they should be deemed to be, and treated, as convicted felons and traitors.

Such an act comes precisely within the definition of a bill of attainder, and the English
courts would enforce it without indictment or trial by jury. .. "
In the case of Proclamations, 12 Co. Rep. 74, 75, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352 (K.B. 1610),
Chief Justice Coke said: "But 9 Hen. 4 an act of parliament was made, that all the

Irish people should depart the realm, and go into Ireland before the Feast of the Nativity
of the Blessed Lady, upon pain of death, which was absolutely in terrorem, and was
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter justified his truncation of the bill of attainder
clause by saying that "There are other provisions in the Constitution, specific
and comprehensive, effectively designed to assure the liberties of our
citizens."125 Presumably he refers .to the Bill of Rights and the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; but these were not in existence when
the Constitution was drafted. If Mr. Justice Frankfurter is right, the
state legislatures, from 1789 to 1868, were in no way restrained by the
Federal Constitution from putting a man to death by vote, if only his life
had been so blameless that he escaped all reproach for past conduct. Probably the framers of the Constitution did not intend that.
Justice Field was right in saying that the imposition of a disability on
a principle of discrimination which is irrelevant to the proscribed activity
discloses a penal intent. Justice Frankfurter was right in saying that a
measure avowedly intended to penalize past conduct discloses a penal
intent. But these are not the only ways in which legislatures are capable
of giving effect to penal intents, nor are they the only cases in which courts
have uncovered such intent. United States v. Lovett presents a third type
of case; Ex parte Garland presents a fourth. Both these cases involve
what Freund called "censorial" judgment of individuals. 20 In the Lovett
case the individuals were measured against a general standard; in Garland,
the standard was defined in terms of the individuals.
"In such cases, the legislature assumes judicial magistracy, pronouncing
on the guilt of the party without any of the common forms . . .of trial.
. .,)27
" The bill of attainder clause forbade a process as well as an outcome. In many cases the outcome would not be a penalty without the use
of the prohibited process. Administrative discharge of subversive employees
is not a penalty, but legislative discharge is penal. By appropriate judicial
proceedings an attorney may be disbarred, and this is not penal, although
direct legislative proscription, as in Ex parte Garland, is penal. It appears
that there are certain results which the legislature is forbidden to achieve
directly; the legislative decision is a bill of attainder.
There is nothing objectionable about the legislative establishment of
appropriate qualifications for an office or vocation. In establishing qualifications, the legislature spells out the affirmative qualities which are implied in
utterly against the law." This was not an attainder in the British sense because there
was no corruption of blood.
Under the view adopted in this article, a disqualification based upon a legislative
judgment of faulty character is a bill of attainder, whether the legislature grounds its
action on past conduct, on other evidence or on no evidence at all. It seems more improper
to disqualify on conjecture than on past conduct.
25. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 326, 66 Sup. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed. 1252

(1946).
26.

FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE

27. 2

STORY,

POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY

loc. cit. supra note 13.

100 (1928).
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the activity admission to which is restricted. 28 These qualifications do not
exclude any designated person or class of persons; all are eligible to acquire
the qualifications. The establishment of disabilities is another matter. Here
the legislature does not confine itself to reciting the requisite virtues which
serve as qualifications; it specifies a characteristic which it declares to constitute a disqualification. Even here, however, the legislative action is not
necessarily censorial or penal. When the legislature declares that persons
suffering from communicable disease shall not be teachers, or that epileptics
shall not drive automobiles, it is not passing judgment on those excluded.
Another example is afforded by the statutes which impose disabilities upon
persons occupying a given position or status because admitting them to the
activity in question would expose them to a temptation to which many
people would succumb. Public servants have been excluded by law from
business transactions related to their official positions, 29 and from political
activities;30 railroads are forbidden by the commodities clause to haul the
products of their own mines or factories;31 certain shippers are forbidden
to act as freight forwarders ;32 elaborate restrictions hedge in officers and
employees of banks 33 and investment companies,3 4 the directors of other
concerns,35 trustees under trust indentures, 6 and some other persons who
act in a fiduciary capacity. Although these disqualifications are established
in terms of anticipated fault of character, there has been no legislative judgment of the particular persons. The legislature relies upon common knowledge, that temptation leads in some cases to misconduct. Its judgment is in
terms of general psychology. It is discharging the proper legislative function
28. Requiring professional competence of physicians is not a bill of attainder. Dent
v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 9 Sup. Ct. 231, 32 L. Ed. 623 (1889). Increasing the
qualifications for the practice of drugless healing is not a bill of attainder even as to
persons presently licensed. Butcher v. Mayberry, 8 F.2d 155 (W.D. Wash. 1925). A
statute forbidding the practice of naturopathy is not a bill of attainder even as to persons
already licensed to practice. Davis v. Beeler, 185 Tenn. 638, 207 S.W.2d 343 (1947), 1
VAND. L. REv. 451 (1948), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 859 (1948).
29. The earlier statutes are collected in Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 1 Sup. Ct.
381, 27 L. Ed. 232 (1882). See also 62 STAT. 694 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 216 (Supp. 1950) ;
62 STAT. 697, as amended, 18 U.S.S. §§ 281-84 (Supp. 1950) ; Exec. Order No. 359 (1905).
30. The First and Second Hatch Acts [53 STAT. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C.
§ 118i (1950), and 54 STAT. 767, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118k (1950) ] were upheld in
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 Sup. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed. 754 (1947) ;
and Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 67 Sup. Ct. 544,
91 L. Ed. 794 (1947).
31. 24 STAT. 379 (1906), 49 US.C. § 1(8) (1946), upheld in Delaware, L. & W.R.R.
v. United States, 231 U.S. 363, 34. Sup. Ct. 65, 58 L. Ed. 269 (1913).
32. 56 STAT. 293 (1942), 49 U.S.C. § 1011(b) (1946).
33. 48 STAT. 194 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1946), upheld in Board of
Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 67 Sup. Ct. 411, 91 L. Ed. 408 (1947) ; 62 STAT. 694
(1948), 18 U.S.C. § 217 (Supp. 1950) ; 62 STAT. 695 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 220-21 (Supp.

1950).

34. 54
35. 38
36. 53

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1946).
732 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1946).
1157 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj (1946).
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of establishing general rules of conduct, not the judicial function of appraising
the faults of individuals.
We have a very different situation when the legislature inquires into
the character of the persons disqualified.3 7 Here the disqualification results
from a legislative judgment that the proscribed persons possess a characteristic not found in people in general. It rests, not upon general psychology,
but upon evidence. It is a determination, judicial in nature, of culpability
or blameworthiness. It is usual to assess such states of mind in awarding
penalties-criminal penalties, civil penalties, exemplary damages. Blackstone
said that crime involved a "vicious will."' 38 In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Company,39 Chief Justice Taft found the child-labor tax a penalty rather
than a tax because its incidence depended on a state of mind: "Scienter
is associated with penalties not with taxes." 40 And in United States v. Lovett
it was held that when Congress determined that certain named individuals
were "subversive" and were unfit for public employment this was a bill of
attainder.
There are, of course, cases in which character is evaluated in administrative and judicial proceedings and the outcome is not a penalty-in licensing
and in awarding the custody of children, for example. In such proceedings
the issue ordinarily cannot be raised by the tribunal which judges (although in revocation of licenses it may be); the test applied has already
been established by a general law; the hearing observes appropriate procedural safeguards. In legislative disqualification, on the other hand, the
legislature takes the initiative in raising the question; it enacts the standard
which it applies; and it proceeds, as Story pointed out, "without any of
the common forms .

.

. of trial, and satisfying itself with proofs, when such

proofs are within its reach, whether they are conformable to the rules of
evidence or not."4 Acting in this manner discloses a penal intent.
So viewed, the bill of attainder clause is a more specific implementation
of the separation of powers. It represents the view universally held at the
time of the framing of the Constitution: "It is the peculiar province of the
legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the ap37. In his concurring opinion in the American Communications case, ir. Justice
Jackson confuses the two. He says: "I have sometimes wondered why I must file papers
showing I did not steal my car before I can get a license for it." 339 U.S. at 435. The
licensing of cars is a privilege confined to the owners of cars; documentary proof of
ownership is affirmative proof of qualification. This is very different from an act which
says: "Robert H. Jackson for want of qualification is hereby forbidden to own or
operate an automobile."
38. 4 BL. Comm. *21.
39. 259 U.S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817, 21 A.L.R. 1432 (1922).
40. 259 U.S. at 37.
41. 2 STORY, 10C. cit. supra note 13.
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plication of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty
of other departments." 4 2
This problem has arisen rather seldom, because legislatures have seldom
had the impertinence to attempt to appraise character. In upholding the
Ohio law for the licensing of dealers in securities, Justice McKenna remarked: "it is certainly apparent that if the conditions are within the
power of the State to impose, they can only be ascertained by an executive
officer. Reputation and character are quite tangible attributes, but there
can be no legislative definition of them that can automatically attach to or
identify individuals possessing them, and necessarily the aid of some executive agency must be invoked. ' 43 And in Bratton v. Chandler,44 the Court
at least thought it possible .that the due process clause requires that an
applicant for a license as real estate broker or salesman be given a hearing
and an opportunity to meet adverse evidence. It construed a Tennessee
statute to authorize these, on the ground that any other interpretation would
raise grave constitutional doubts.
If we assume that the bill of attainder clause forbids the legislature to
inquire into character and to impose a disability as a result of its findings,
Hawker v. New York 4 5 must be considered. In that case the Court upheld
a New York statute which forbade persons who had previously been convicted of felony to practice medicine.
"But if a state may require good character as a condition of the practice of
medicine, it may rightfully determine what shall be the evidences of that character.
We do not mean to say that it has an arbitrary power in the matter, or that it can
make a conclusive test of that which has no relation to character, but it may take
whatever, according to the experience of mankind, reasonably tends to prove the fact
and make it a test .... Whatever is ordinarily connected with bad character, or indicative of it, may be prescribed by the legislature as conclusive evidence thereof. It is not
the province of the courts to say that other tests would be more satisfactory, or that
the naming of other qualifications would be more conducive to the desired result. These
are questions for the legislature to determine.
"It is not open to doubt that the commission of crime, the violation of the penal
laws of a State, has some relation to the question of character. It is not, as a rule, the
good people who commit crime. When the legislature declares that whoever has
violated the criminal laws of the State shall be deemed lacking in good moral character it is not laying down an arbitrary or fanciful rule-one having no relation to
the subject-matter, but is only appealing to a well recognized fact of human experience;
and if it may make a violation of criminal law a test of bad character, what more conclusive evidence of the fact of such violation can there be than a conviction duly had
in one of the courts of the State? The conviction is, as between the State and the
defendant, an adjudication of the fact. So if the legislature enacts that one who has been
42. Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 136, 3 L. Ed. 162 (1810).
And see Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 8 Am. Dec. 52 (1818).
43. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 553, 37 Sup. Ct. 217, 61 L. Ed. 480 (1917).
44. 260 U.S. 110, 43 Sup. Ct. 43, 67 L. Ed. 157 (1922).
45. 170 U.S. 189, 18 Sup. Ct. 573, 42 L. Ed. 1002 (1898).
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convicted of crime shall no longer engage in the practice of medicine, it is simply
applying the doctrine of res judicata and invoking the conclusive adjudication of the
fact that the man has violated the criminal lav, and is presumptively, therefore, a man
'of such bad character as to render it unsafe to trust the lives and health of citizens to
his care.:'"
The difference between this and the Lovett case is readily apparent.
Here, as in establishing disqualifications for persons of given status because
o f the temptation offered by the conjunction of the status and the proscribed
activity, the legislature acts upon a "well recognized fact of human experience."
It does not take evidence or inquire into the character of individuals; in fact,
the individuals involved are unknown at the time the act is passed. This
seems to be a legislative rather than a judicial act.
In conformity with Hawker v. New York, it has been held that conviction of felony may be made a disqualification for public office.47 Other
statutes have carried the policy further. New York has also disqualified
dentists and veterinarians who have been convicted of felony. 48 The Secretary
of the Treasury is instructed not to license any person to deal in liquor who
has been convicted of felony within the past five years, or of a misdemeanor
under any federal law relating to liquor within three years.49 The Investment
Company Act bars those convicted of crimes in securities transactions from
any connection with investment companies.5 0 Persons adjudged guilty of
violating the antitrust laws by monopolizing or attempting to monopolize
radio communication are not eligible for licenses to construct or operate radio
stations.51 The Packers and Stockyards Act appears to be unique in that
it requires no judicial proceeding; the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized
to refuse a license to deal in poultry if he finds that the applicant has engaged in any of the practices forbidden by the Act within two years prior
2
to his application.5
All these statutes rest on the argument of Hawker v. New York. There
is in each case a notorious connection between the disqualification and the
activity barred. No legislative investigation of character occurs; the disability is testified to by "the experience of mankind."
But this was true also of the disqualification in Ex parte Garland.
It cannot be argued that the disqualification in the Garland case was irrelevant to the activity in question. As Justice Miller pointed out in his
46. 170 U.S. at 195.
47. Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (1884); Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551,
139 N.E. 360 (1923), writ of error dismissed, 267 U.S. 575 (1925).
48. N.Y. EDuc. LAw §§ 6613, 6702.

49. 49 STAT. 978 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 204 (1946).
50. 54 STAT. 805 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9 (1946).

51. 48 STAT. 1086 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 311 (1946).
52. 49 STAT. 648 (1935), 7 U.S.C. § 218a, upheld in Handy Bros. Co. v. Wallace,
16 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Pa. 1936).
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dissent: "fidelity to the government . . . [is] among the most essential
qualifications which should be required in a lawyer."53 So it has been held
that admission to the bar may be conditioned not only on loyalty but on
willingness to bear arms.5 4 Past acts of disloyalty are certainly evidence, as
notorious as a judicial conviction of felony, of unfitness. Nor-is there
any difference in the reliability of the findings of fact. Inability to take
the oath establishes the fact as surely as a judicial conviction would have
done. Where, then, is the difference between the Garland and Hawker cases?
The difference is this. In the Hawker case, as we have seen, the
legislature did not identify the persons disqualified. These were determined
by an impersonal process outside the control of the legislature. In the
Garland case the statute must be treated as though it enumerated all the
persons affected and by name excluded them from the practice of law.
Garland's position was exactly as though the statute read: '!A. H. Garland,
having served in the legislature of the Confederacy, is forbidden to practice
law in any federal court." The device of the oath made it possible to pass
a John Doe bill of attainder covering thousands and to put upon the individuals proscribed the duty, under pain of prosecution for perjury, of
filling in their own names in th blanks. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said
of the Garland and Cummings cases: "That the persons legislatively punished
were not named was a mere detail of identification. Congress and the
Missouri legislature, respectively, had provided the most effective method for
insuring identification." 55
Certainly it is proper for the legislature to establish a general requirement of loyalty for attorneys. What is improper is for the legislature to disqualify specified individuals. The statute in Ex parte Garland both created
and applied a disqualification. It is irrelevant that those proscribed actually
came within the disqualification. It could not be otherwise, since the disqualification was tailored to the exact dimensions of the proscribed group.
Congress acted simultaneously as legislature and judge. This is forbidden
by the bill of attainder clause.
There is one point of difference between the Garland and the Lovett
cases. In Garland those disqualified were undoubtedly justly accused of
the fault, for the fault was defined in terms of them, and they in terms of
the fault. In the Lovett case there is only a legislative finding, which on the
merits appears to deserve no respect, that those accused were justly accused
of a fault which others were capable of sharing. But in both cases the
legislature undertook to impose a disqualification for fault of character; in
53. 4 Wall. at 385.
54. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 66 Sup. Ct. 94, 90 L. Ed. 491 (1945).

55. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 327, 66 Sup. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed. 1252 (1946).
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both cases this was held to be a bill of attainder, for the reason that Congress
is forbidden to make these judgments about individuals.
In three of the five cases involving exculpatory oaths disclaiming a
designated fault of character-in Cummings v. Missouri, Ex parte Garland,
and Pierce v. Carskadon-the Supreme Court has held the requirement to be
a bill of attainder. In the fourth, Davis v. Beason, 6 in which the Court
upheld a territorial statute imposing a test oath for the disfranchising of
Mormons, the attainder question was not discussed. In American Communications Association v. Douqds,57 the exaction of a disclaimer of membership in
the Communist party was upheld. The Court merely remarked that the
imposition of oaths is a common and necessary practice. This is certainly true.
The requirement of an oath that the applicant possesses the necessary
affirmative qualifications for an office or activity is not a legislative determination of fault. The requirement of an oath that one lacks a disqualification not turning on blameworthiness-a disclaimer of epilepsy by an applicant
for a driver's license, for example-is not a legislative judgment of fault of
character. But the requirement of an exculpatory oath is the legislative
identification of persons upon whom the legislature has passed a blanket
judgment of fault of character; it is an instrument in a bill of attainder.
To summarize, it is proper for the legislature to establish relevant disqualifications for an office or occupation so long as these are not grounded on
a legislative determination of fault or culpability in the persons disqualified;
but a legislative disqualification so grounded is a bill of attainder. So the
Lovett case stands for the proposition that the legislature may not apply a
valid standard of disqualification to individuals and itself determine their
blameworthiness. According to Ex parte Garland, the legislature may not
enact a blanket disqualification of a group of individuals who are identified
56. 133 U.S. 333, 10 Sup. Ct. 299, 33 L. Ed. 637 (1890). And see Murphy v. Ramsey,
114 U.S. 15, 5 Sup. Ct. 747, 29 L. Ed. 47 (1885).
The cases on exculpatory oaths in other jurisdictions, are in conflict. In accord with
the Cummings and Garland cases are In re Baxter, 2 Fed. Cas. 1043 No. 1118 (E.D.
Tenn. 1866); Commonwealth v. Jones, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 725 (1874); Murphy and
Glover Test Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 340 (1867) ; State v. Heighland, 41 Mo. 388 (1867) ;
Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418 (1868) ; Kyle v. Jenkins, 6 W. Va. 371 (1873). Contra:
Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293 (1863) Shepherd v. Grimmett, 2 Idaho 1123, 31 Pac.
793 (1892) ; Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531 (1865) ; State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119 (1868) ;
State ex rel. Wingate v. Woodson, 41 Mo. 227 (1867) ; State v. Garesche, 36 Mo. 256
(1865); Ex parte Quarrier and Fitzhugh, 4 W. Va. 210 (1870); Randolph v. Good,
3 W. Va. 551 (1869) ; Ex parte Hunter, 2 W. Va. 122 (1867) ; Ex parte Stratton, 1 W.
Va. 304 (1866).
Of course it is the legislative proscription and not the oath that makes the measure
a bill of attainder. Agreeing with the leading cases in the absence of an oath are Baltimore
v. State, 15 Md. 376 (1860) ; Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 82 Am. Dec. 65 (1862). Contra:
Boyd v. Mills, 53 Kan. 594, 37 Pac. 16, 25 L.R.A. 486 (1894).
The same result as that in the Cummings and Garland cases may be reached under
another prohibition. Communist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889 (1942) ; cf.
Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806 (1950).
57. 339 U.S. 382, 70 Sup. Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 597 (1950).
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by the possession of a common characteristic, even when that characteristic
would be a proper disqualification in an administrative or judicial adjudication of character. It is, however, proper for the legislature to disqualify a
class of persons, not in terms of its own appraisal of their fault but in the
light of "the experience of mankind," when the members of the class are
ascertained by some other organ of the government than the legislature-in
Hawker v.New York, by the judiciary through a conviction of felony.
As we have seen, the American Communications Association case conflicts with both the Lovett and Garland cases. It requires extended discussion.
The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Vinson and was subscribed to by Justices Burton and Reed. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson
concurred in upholding the non-Communist affidavit. The Court applied to
the legislative decision the substantial evidence rule, which is appropriate in
reviewing the actions of administrative tribunals.
"Substantial amounts of evidence were presented to various committees of Congress,
including the committees immediately concerned with labor legislation, that Communist
leaders of labor unions had in the past and would continue in the future to subordinate
legitimate trade union objectives to obstructive strikes when dictated by Party leaders,
often in support of the policies of a foreign government .... At the committee hearings,
the incident most fully developed was a strike at the Milwaukee plant of the AllisChalmers Manufacturing Company in 1941, when that plant was producing vital materials for the national defense program.... Congress heard testimony that the strike
had been called solely in obedience to Party orders for the purpose of starting the
'snowballing of strikes' in defense plants."'
Under this decision, ex parte testimony from interested witnesses, consisting largely of hearsay, is enough to justify Congress in determining that
designated persons possess a special character which warrants their exclusion
from any activity under federal control. In his dissent Mr. Justice Black said:

58. 339 U.S. at 388. Congress and the Court preferred to believe the testimony of

Mr. Louis Budenz that Allis-Chalmers was engaged upon defense contracts of at least
$30,000,000 [5 HearingsBefore House Committee of Labor on Bills to Amend and Repeal
the National Labor Relations Act, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3612 (1947) ],rather than that
of Mr. Harold W. Story, Vice-President of the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,

which seems to indicate that Allis-Chalmers had no government contracts:
"Senator Murray: Well, I am talking about prior to the war-during the period
of rearmament in this country.
"Didn't your company refuse to accept any contract from the United States Government for the preparation of this country; and wasn't the leadership of your organization

engaged in backing America First; and didn't they making strong contributions to
America First-heavy contributions to America First?

"Mr. Story: Well, as far as I know, there were no contributions to America First....
"Senator Murray: But it accepted no contracts for war work?

"Mr. Story: It accepted all the contracts that it had an opportunity to accept, within

the limit of its ability to produce, in accordance with the promised dates of shipment....

"Senator Murray: Was your company at that time seeking or negotiating contracts
with the Government for war production or for production of armaments for the country?
"Mr. Story: We have been negotiating with the Government for contracts long before
that time, Senator." 2 Hearings Before Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
on S. 55 and S.J. Res. 22, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 837, 839, 841 (1947).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 4

"Under today's opinion Congress could validly bar all members of these [minority]
parties from officership in unions or industrial corporations; the only showing required
would be testimony that some members in such positions had, by attempts to further
their party's purposes, unjustifiably fostered industrial strife which hampered interstate commerce. " '

This is not far-fetched. It may be said also that if persons should testify
before Congressional committees as to the validity of the Protocols of Zion,
this would, under the majority opinion, constitute substantial evidence on
the basis of which Congress might legitimately exclude all Jews from positions in national banking associations. The Court was at pains to point out
that "accidents of birth and ancestry under some circumstances justify an
inference concerning future conduct .. ."GO To come closer to the question

in hand, what is to prevent Congress from passing an act forbidding a
union to be represented before the National Labor Relations Board by
John L. Lewis? He has frequently interrupted interstate commerce, and
"substantial evidence" of discreditable motives, if that be necessary, would
be forthcoming from the appropriate sources.
The Chief Justice's opinion deals summarily with the attainder issue.
He disposes of the Cummings, Garland and Lovett cases by saying that in
those cases individuals were being punished for past actions; here the
statute is grounded on apprehension over future conduct, although "the
history of the past conduct is the foundation for the judgment as to what
the future conduct is likely to be." 0 1 It would be hard to think of better
evidence of disloyalty or a more ominous augury for future conduct than
Garland's past career. It also seems odd to concede that Lovett, Watson and
Dodd had been subversive because the House of Representatives had accumulated "substantial evidence" to that effect, and yet to say that the
House was moved by the desire to punish past conduct rather than to guard
against future harm in barring them from public employment.
But it cannot be said that the Chief Justice's opinion rests entirely
on this distinction. He converts the disqualification into a qualification
by pointing out that the act proscribes only present membership in the
Communist party. "Here the intention is to forestall future dangerous acts;
there is no one who may not, by a voluntary alteration of the loyalties which
59. 339 U.S. at 450. It is a matter of some interest that members of the Republican
party were once proscribed by statute. In 1860 the Maryland legislature created a Board
of Police for Baltimore by a statute which provided "that no Black Republican, or
endorser or approver of the Helper [antislavery] Book" should be appointed to any
office under the Board. The Court of Appeals said that the statute was unconstitutional
"if we are to consider that class of persons as proscribed on account of their political
or religious opinions. But we cannot understand, officially, who are meant to be affected
by the proviso, and, therefore, cannot express a judicial opinion on the question." Balti-

more v. State, 15 Md. 376, 468 (1860).
60. 339 U.S. at 391.

61. Id. at 413.
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impel him to action, become eligible to sign the affidavit. '62 This statement
does not seem to be a fair report of the facts. The non-Communist affidavit
is not an affidavit of loyalty or an avowal of any principles which impel to
action. It is merely a disclaimer of membership in an organization. Members
of the organization have been proscribed by Congress because Congress has
formed an adverse judgment on their character; nor are they allowed any
opportunity to profess or demonstrate the loyalty or the virtuous principles
which the Court seems to believe are implied in the non-Communist affidavit.
This is clearly enough a disqualification. To be sure, the statute allows them
to escape the disqualification by resigning from the organization; but this
does not involve an abjuration of political strikes or the affirmative profession
of any new loyalty. Assuming that a man is wedded to political strikes,
coercion such as this will merely deepen his attachment. The escape from
disqualification afforded by the statute does not convert the disqualification
into a qualification; rather, it exhibits the statute as what it is-a measure
which attaches a legislative penalty to membership in an organization, and
serves no other purpose whatever.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred, saying that "the judgment of
Congress that trade unions which are guided by officers who are committed
by ties of membership to the Communist Party must forego the advantages
of the Labor Management Relations Act is reasonably related to the accomplisbment of the purposes which Congress constitutionally had a right
-to pursue." 63 But the provision of the oath which required disavowal of
belief in the overthrow of the government by illegal or unconstitutional
methods appeared to him too vague to meet the requirements of due process.
Mr. Justice Jackson found his own reasons for concurring in the
majority decision. "If the statute before us required labor union officers
to forswear membership in the Republican Party, the Democratic Party,
or the 'Socialist Party, I suppose all agree it would be unconstitutional. But
why, if it is valid as to the Communist Party ?"64 Mr. Justice Jackson finds.
that: "From information before its several Committees and from facts
of general knowledge, Congress could rationally conclude that, behind its
political facade, the Communist Party is a conspiratorial and revolutionary
junta, organized to reach ends and to use methods which are incompatible
with our constitutional system.1 65 A footnote refers the reader to literature
62. Id. at 414.
63. Id. at 418. This quotation provides an interesting contrast to Justice Frankfurter's
attitude toward legislative decisions affecting the property of public utilities. "Foreago that
shadowed nearly sixty years ago, . . . it was decided more than fifty years
the final say under the Constitution lies with the judiciary and not the legislature"
Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 625, 64 Sup. Ct. 281,
88 L,Ed. 393 (1944).
64. 339 U.S. at 422.
65. Id. at 424.
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which "the Congress may or could have considered""' in arriving at the conclusion indorsed by Mr. Justice Jackson. The least trammelled of our
Justices, he is not disturbed by the fact that Congress failed to reach this
conclusion. In the Herzog case counsel for the NLRB, in defending the oath,
conceded:
"I agree there is a wide gap there and Congress did not find-I might as well make
it clear now-it did not find and it did not purport to find, and it is our position that
it did not need to and could not properly have found, that the Communist party advocates the doctrine of the violent overthrow of the Government by force or other unconstitutional means. That is just no part of this case"07
After a lengthy argument resting chiefly on his own views on political
science, Mr. justice Jackson asserts that Congress, by virtue of its rational
conclusions about the nature of members of the Communist party, might
properly protect interstate commerce from Communists. But he proceeds
to argue with equal vehemence against the remainder of the oath, which
requires a disclaimer of revolutionary opinions. It is proper to exclude from
the ranks of union officials Communists who are willing to swear allegiance
to the United States and to disavow a belief in "the overthrow of the
United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
methods," but not to bar those who cannot swear such allegiance or disclaim
such belief. It is a little hard to justify this. Justice Jackson finds -the difference in the presence of an overt act, affiliation, in the case of Communists,
and the absence of an overt act in the case of revolutionaries. The nonCommunist oath is an inquiry into action, whereas the oath as to opinion
unassociated with an overt act is "thought control." This objection raises
some doubt as to the propriety of exacting an oath of allegiance from
public officials and members of the armed forces.
Justices Douglas, Clark and Minton took no part in the decision. In
Osnan v. Douds,68 however, a case involving the same issues, Justice Minton,
609
-who had already upheld the oath in its entirety on the Court of Appeals,
concurred in the Chief Justice's opinion. Justice Douglas concurred with
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson in declaring the oath as to opinion void,
and since he considered the statute not to be severable he did not pass on
the requirement of the non-Communist affidavit. Justice Black dissented
in both cases; in the American Communications Association case he wrote
a brief but eloquent opinion in which he denounced the requirement of an
affidavit as to membership or opinion as a bill of attainder and a violation
66. Id. at 424 n2 (italics supplied).
67. Quoted in National Maritime Union v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146, 181 (D.D.C.
1948), aff'd men. 334 U.S. 854 (1948).
68. 339 U.S. 846, 70 Sup. Ct. 901, 94 L. Ed. 530 (1950).
69. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
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of the First Amendment. This was unavailing. The attitude of the majority of
the Court was aptly stated by Mr. Justice Jackson. The Court must act, he
said, "in the light of present-day actualities, not nostalgic idealizations
valid for a simpler age."' 70 The nostalgic idealization at state in the American
Communications case was that stated by James Madison: "The accumulation
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
'71
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."
70. 339 U.S. at 435.
71. THE FEDERALIST, No. 47 (Madison).

